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ABSTRACT 
 
For many economists government intervention is linked to low levels of interpersonal trust and 
corruption, while, on the contrary, for many political scientists, government intervention is associ-
ated to high trust and low corruption. The goal of this paper is to reconcile these contrasting find-
ings by distinguishing the differing effects of trust over two alternative types of government inter-
vention: regulation and taxation. Low-trust individuals demand more governmental regulation but 
less government taxation. We test the hypotheses by focusing on a particular policy – i.e. environ-
mental policy – where governments use different mixes of regulatory and tax mechanisms, and for 
which we have data on both trust in others (interpersonal trust) and trust in public institutions (in-
stitutional trust). The main finding is that those individuals with low trust (both interpersonal and 
institutional trust) tend to demand, ceteris paribus, more governmental regulation of the environ-
ment and, but are less inclined to pay higher taxes to protect the environment. We also find that the 
effect of institutional trust is stronger than the effect of interpersonal trust, which puts previous 
studies in a perspective. 
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Introduction 
Both political scientists (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, Rothstein 2011) and economists (Alesina and 
Angeletos 2005b, Aghion et al. 2010, Pinotti 2012) have revisited the relationship between culture 
and institutions explored in many classical sociological studies from Banfield (1958) to Putnam 
(1993). That is, up to which extent the values prevailing in a society are related to its political insti-
tutions? And, in particular, do the levels of interpersonal trust lead to a smaller or bigger govern-
ment? Yet the responses point out in contrasting directions: while for some scholars government 
intervention is linked to low trust and corruption, others claim the opposite.  
On the one hand, some researchers argue that a society where individuals trust each other is corre-
lated with low levels of corruption and, in turn, with citizens who are more willing to support a 
highly-redistributive welfare state (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Irrespective of whether the causal 
arrow goes from redistributive institutions to high interpersonal trust (Rothstein 2011, Dinesen 
2013) or the other way around (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011, 2014, Daniele and Geys 2015), this 
strand of thought underlines the idea of societies entering virtuous (or vicious) cycles of high (low) 
trust, low (high) corruption and high (low) government redistribution (Rothstein and Uslaner 
2005). Along similar lines, experiments using public good games show a higher cooperative behav-
ior – that is, a higher support for social welfare – among high-trust individuals (Fehr and Leib-
brandt, 2011; Thöni, Tyran, and Wengström 2012). 
On the other hand, another line of scholarship – more prevalent among economists – considers 
that, quite the contrary, it is actually high levels of corruption what impulses citizens to ask for 
more government intervention. If a society believes that “corruption determine wealth, it will levy 
high taxes” (Alesina and Angeletos 2005a, 960). This generates feedback mechanisms, because, in 
turn, “bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption” (Alesina and Angeletos 2005b, 
1227). If, on the contrary, “a society believes that individual effort determines income (…), it will 
choose low redistribution and low taxes” (Alesina and Angeletos 2005a, 960). Similarly, if a society 
perceives most of its agents as untrustworthy, it will also demand more government regulation. For 
instance, if citizens believe most individuals will free-ride and generate negative externalities such as 
environmental pollution, they will prefer command-and-control solutions – such a strict regulation 
– over less restrictive alternatives (Harring, 2015). Consequently, we have two type of societies or 
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“two equilibria: a good one with a large share of civic individuals and no regulation, and a bad one, 
where a large share of uncivic individuals support heavy regulation” (Aghion et al. 2010, 1016).  
This paper aims to reconcile the findings of those scholars linking state intervention to civic behav-
ior (or high trust) with those linking it to uncivic behavior (or low trust). In this sense, we follow 
recent work that has noted either the opposing effects of interpersonal trust on attitudes toward 
government intervention (Harring, 2015, Pitlik and Kouba 2015) or the conditional effects of trust 
depending on the perceived quality of public institutions (Daniele and Geys 2015). Unlike these 
approaches, which disentangle the effects of two different types of trust (interpersonal and institu-
tional trust), the contribution of this paper is distinguishing between two types of state intervention 
– regulation and taxation, which act as partial substitutes of each other 
Our view echoes empirical developments in comparative political economy that point out two dis-
tinct dimensions of government intervention (Hopkin and Blyth 2012, Hopkin, Lapuente and Möl-
ler 2013). On the one hand, countries that heavily regulate an economic sector (e.g. finance) also 
tend to heavily regulate others (e.g. labor and product markets). On the other, this pattern of regu-
lation is not correlated to taxation and redistribution. Take Denmark or Sweden, low-regulated 
economies with high taxation; or, at the other extreme of the OECD, Spain or Japan, highly-
regulated economies with low taxation. Our paper aims to provide micro-foundations for these 
“two varieties of government intervention” (ibid.): regulation and taxation. We argue that why 
some societies marginally prefer regulatory solutions over tax-based ones to similar collective prob-
lems may depend on the prevailing trust levels among its citizens.  
Our theoretical approach is based on two insights from evolutionary theories and experimental 
studies. Firstly, that individuals with both high interpersonal and institutional trust are more willing 
to cooperate (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Thöni, Tyran, and Wengström 2012). Second, that a re-
productive strategy for defectors may consist on engaging in what is known as “anti-social punish-
ment” (Cinyabuguma et al 2006, Denant-Boemont et al 2007, Hermann 2008) – that is, to punish 
everyone in a society irrespective of whether they “deserve” it or not. This “‘dark side’ of punish-
ment” (Rand et al. 2010, 624), far from being irrational, is a survival strategy for defectors (low-
trust individuals in our interpretation) – who, otherwise, could be replaced by cooperators (high-
trust individuals), since the latter’s payoffs would constantly increase if only defectors are punished. 
Consequently, defectors may prefer a too stringent regulation even if – or specially if – it is imple-
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mented by an arbitrary ruler: by inflicting harm to everyone defectors reduce the others’ payoffs by 
more than their relative payoff. Put together, these two insights point out two alternative ways of 
solving collective problems: one more centered on cooperation (which, in turn, would be reflected 
on a higher willingness to pay taxes) and other more centered on punishment (i.e. higher reliance 
on government regulation).   
The paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the two hypotheses on the opposing ef-
fects of (interpersonal and institutional) trust on government intervention. Our first hypothesis is 
that there should be a positive effect of both types of trust –interpersonal and institutional – over the demand for 
government taxation. Our second hypothesis states that there should be a negative effect of both types of 
trust –interpersonal and institutional – over the demand for government regulation. Subsequently, we test these 
hypotheses in a policy area where governments use both regulatory as well as taxation mechanisms: 
environmental policies. We employ hierarchical regression models on the fifth wave of the World 
Values Survey, covering 40,000 individuals from 37 countries. We find that, controlling for socio-
economic factors as well as levels of interpersonal trust, those individuals who mistrust their public 
institutions tend to demand, ceteris paribus, more governmental regulation of the environment 
(Hypothesis 2) and, at the same time, are less inclined to pay higher taxes to protect the environ-
ment (Hypothesis 1). 
These findings at individual level seem to concur with the aggregate relationship between trust 
levels and government intervention in cross-national comparisons. We can see them in Figures 1 
and 2, which plot national average levels of interpersonal trust and indicators of both government 
regulation and taxation/redistribution for OECD countries. Figure 1 shows the negative relation-
ship between average levels of interpersonal trust in a country and the intensity of government 
regulation in labor, product, and financial markets. The composite index of regulation comes from 
Hopkin, Lapuente and Möller (2013), who use a wide range of measurements produced by the 
World Bank, the OECD and the Heritage foundation.i On the contrary, in Figure 2, which plots 
national average levels of interpersonal trust country and government redistributionii, we do not see 
a negative correlation. If any, there seems to be a positive association between interpersonal trust 
and redistribution levels.  
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FIGURE 1, INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION. 
  
Source: EVS/WVS and Hopkin, Lapuente and Möller 2013 
 
FIGURE 2, INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND GOVERNMENT REDISTRIBUTION  
 
Source: EVS/WVS and OECD Dataset Income Distribution  
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We thus see that countries with low levels of trust (e.g. Greece, Mexico, Turkey) have some of the 
highest levels of government regulation and the lowest levels of government redistribution. That is, 
their governments are highly interventionist when it comes to defining labor relations, the number 
of steps needed to start a new business, opening hours, entry levels and specific regulations of all 
sort of economic activities. Yet they are poorly interventionists regarding redistributing income 
through taxation. Conversely, governments in high-trust countries (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Sweden) 
intervene relatively little in regulation, giving freedom to their economic agents to innovate (Hop-
kin, Lapuente and Möller 2013), and, at the same time, intervene a lot in redistribution. This com-
bination of a generous welfare protection (i.e. high intervention in redistribution) with very liberal 
labor laws (i.e. low intervention in regulation), known as the ‘flexicurity’, has been praised by policy-
makers and researchers for its ability to promote an inclusive growth (Sapir et al 2004, Sapir 2006, 
Hopkin and Blyth 2012).  In this paper we aim to investigate the micro-foundations of this model 
of intervention – and its reverse, the ‘rigi-insecuriy’ model of high regulation and low redistribution 
that seems prevailing in low-trust countries – by exploring individual attitudes towards government 
intervention.     
 
Theory 
The literature has noted the paradoxical opposing effects of interpersonal trust attitudes toward 
state intervention (Pitlik and Kouba 2015). On the one hand, high-interpersonal trust has been 
associated with a “stronger propensity to support government action” (ibid.,359). If you think oth-
ers will not use the welfare system inappropriately, then you are more likely to contribute to it pay-
ing high taxes (Daniele and Geys 2015). Similarly, people need to trust their fellow citizens in order 
to accept the individual costs of taxation, since paying taxes is a collective dilemma in itself (Scholz 
and Lubell 1998). People will not pay if they do not perceive that others pay their fair share of tax-
es. This could explain why historical levels of trust are correlated to current levels of social spend-
ing (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011). In addition, the level of institutional trust – measured by the con-
fidence of citizens in the impartiality of public institutions – has also been argued to positively af-
fect people’s attitude towards government intervention (Hetherington 1998, Rothstein, Samanni 
and Teorell 2012 Svallfors 2013, Daniele and Geys 2015). The support for high taxation-spending 
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should thus rise when citizens trust public institutions will manage tax revenues in an impartial and 
non-corrupt way (Svallfors 2013).  
On the other hand, high interpersonal trust has been linked to lower levels of other government 
intervention: the regulation of economic activities. For this “variety of government intervention” 
(Hopkin, Lapuente and Möller 2013) which is economic regulation the effect of trust does seem to 
reverse. A society with high-trusting individuals may need less regulation. A mechanism would be 
that civicness replaces regulation: “higher generalized trust reduces requirements for economic 
regulation as it goes hand in hand with greater confidence in civicness of anonymous private mar-
ket actors” (Pitlik and Kouba 2015, 359). If an individual thinks most other individuals are not 
trustworthy (i.e. if the interpersonal trust is low), they will want to punish them with stringent regu-
lations. Empirically, Aghion et al. (2010) link low interpersonal trust to high government regulation 
by finding, using World Values Survey data, that less trustful individuals demand more business 
regulation because they expect entrepreneurs to be uncivic. Low-trust individuals will demand 
would-be entrepreneurs to be subject to a more stringent set of administrative procedures, with 
restrictive limitations on when and how a business can be open and under which strict conditions 
employees may be hired and fired. Since an excessive regulation not only is economically inefficient 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003, Djankov et al. 2002), but it also leads to more corruption opportuni-
ties, it emerges a “vicious cycle” going from regulation to corruption, to mistrust, and, again, to 
more regulation. Likewise, Pinotti (2012) finds that low trust is associated with more market entry 
regulations.  
These findings go in line with the “unpleasant capitalist” hypothesis (Di Tella and MacCulloch 
2009, Pitlik and Kouba 2015). Through stringent regulations, distrustful individuals want to punish 
the people (capitalists) whom they regard “bad”. Yet this perspective cannot account for the effects 
of institutional trust: why do individuals who do not trust the one designing and enforcing the regu-
lations do nevertheless demand a higher regulation by this same untrustworthy ruler? Why do you 
want more from an institution you consider “bad”? 
In order to understand this paradox, we resort to recent developments in evolutionary theory that 
have challenged the traditional view of punishment as promotor of cooperation (Hauser, Nowak 
and Rand 2014). The reason is the discovery in numerous experiments of what has been labelled as 
“anti-social punishment” (Cinyabuguma et al 2006, Denant-Boemont et al 2007, Hermann et al. 
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2008). In many occasions, people inflict punishment not only at cooperators – which is the reason 
why punishment was traditionally seen as a mechanism for achieving social cooperation –, but also 
to cooperators (Gächter and Herrmann, 2009, Gächter and Herrmann, 2011, Herrmann et al., 
2008, Rand and Nowak, 2011). For instance, in public goods games free-riders who had been pun-
ished in the last round decided to punish cooperators in the next round as revenge. Due to their 
puzzling nature, these findings from experimental studies were excluded from theoretical models 
(Hauser, Nowak and Rand 2014).  
Yet, in our view, two recent theoretical suggestions may help to understand the also puzzling rela-
tionship between low institutional trust and high support for government regulation. In the first 
place, this “‘dark side’ of punishment” (Rand et al. 2010, 624) which is anti-social punishment may 
be a rational strategy by defectors – or, in our case, low-trust individuals. If punishment were re-
stricted to non-cooperators, cooperators would be increasingly rewarded and, eventually, defectors 
would be eliminated. Yet we see many defectors in real life. And the reason might be an overlooked 
strategy of defectors: the support of an arbitrary punishment that deters all individuals. By inflicting 
harm to everyone, defectors can reduce the others’ payoffs by more than their relative payoff – and 
thus increase their reproductive chances (ibid.). Translated to the issue at stake here, defectors may 
prefer a too stringent government regulation even if – or specially if – it is implemented by an arbi-
trary ruler. The individuals who feel they are going to relatively benefit less from a new business 
opportunity – e.g. low-trust individuals who will engage less in productive exchanges than their 
high-trust fellows – will prefer a regulation that curtails those productive exchanges across the 
board. In evolutionary terms, low-trust individuals compete with high-trust individuals and will aim 
to undermine their reproductive chances by imposing anti-social punishments such as a restrictive 
government regulation of private activities.  
A second mechanism from evolutionary theory that can connect anti-social punishment to higher 
support for government regulation is the observation that anti-social punishment does not seem to 
be uniformly distributed across the world. Intriguingly, anti-social punishment largely varies across 
societies, being more prevailing in places with low levels of social cooperation (e.g. Athens) than in 
places with high levels of social cooperation (e.g. Copenhagen), where individuals exclusively pun-
ish non-cooperators (Herrmann et al. 2008). In other words, anti-social-punishment and coopera-
tion could be (inversely) correlated. The more eager people are to punish, the less willing they are to 
cooperate Herrmann et al. (2008) found, using a cross-national design, that cooperation generates 
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less antisocial punishment since “cooperators, who behave in the normatively desirable way, should 
not get punished; strong norms of civic cooperation might act as a constraint on antisocial punish-
ment” (Herrmann et al. 2008: 1365). This behavior is critically conditioned by the individuals’ per-
ception of their institutions: “The strength of the rule of law in a society might also have an impact 
on antisocial punishment. If the rule of law is strong, people trust the law enforcement institutions, 
which are perceived as being effective, fair, impartial, and bound by the law. Revenge is shunned. If 
the rule of law is weak, the opposite holds. Thus, the rule of law reflects how norms are commonly 
enforced in a society.” (ibid.). This is a second mechanism connecting low-trust individuals to a 
more stringent regulation: that they perceive their societies as lacking rule of law, and thus they 
experience a higher desire to punish both defectors and cooperators. Conversely, if a state is per-
ceived as a credible enforcer, there should be less necessity of preemptively punishing all citizens 
with a restrictive regulation.  
In sum, we have two opposing hypotheses on the relationship between trust and government inter-
vention, depending on the type of such intervention. Regarding taxation, an individual will have a 
stronger willingness to pay taxes if, first, she thinks other individuals will pay their fair share (i.e. if 
the interpersonal trust is high) and if, second, she thinks the taxes will be managed by a fair gov-
ernment (i.e. if the institutional trust is high). Thus, in order to get the acceptance of individuals to 
pay taxes, we would need what Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter (2008, 3) refer to as a “social struc-
ture” of both relatively high interpersonal trust and relatively high institutional trust (cf. Rothstein 
and Uslaner 2005; Scholz and Lubell 1998).  
Hypothesis 1: The more individuals trust their fellow citizens (i.e. interpersonal trust) and their 
public institutions (i.e. institutional trust), the more positive their attitude toward government taxa-
tion. 
Yet, regarding government regulation, the relationship reverses: low interpersonal and institutional 
trust lead to a higher demand of government regulation, because of two mechanisms: first, when 
you do not trust others, you want a highly interventionist government (cf. Aghion et al 2010, Pinot-
ti 2012); and, second, low-trust individuals aim at minimizing the chances of success of high-trust 
individuals, and thus they support a more stringent regulation.  
Hypothesis 2: The less individuals trust their fellow citizens (i.e. interpersonal trust) and their public 
institutions (i.e. institutional trust), the more positive their attitude toward government regulation. 
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Method and material 
In order to test the hypotheses, we employ a hierarchical regression model on the fifth wave of the 
World Values Survey. Previous research on cross-national differences in attitudes to policy instru-
ments has shown that there are contextual effects or more precisely individuals cluster within coun-
tries (Aghion et al. 2010, Harring 2015; see also Franzen and Meyer, 2010). It is then problematic to 
apply for example OLS models, since OLS is based on an assumption the units of analysis are in-
dependent from one another. Instead we apply a hierarchical model.   
Two questions are used to measure attitudes towards environmental state intervention. People are 
asked to consider whether they agree or disagree with the statements “The Government should reduce 
environmental pollution, but it should not cost me any money”, and “I would agree to an increase in taxes if the 
extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution” (“strongly agree”; “agree”; “disagree”; “strongly 
disagree”). 
The first question clearly captures an attitude that the government is responsible for protecting the 
environment, but it should not imply any costs for the respondent personally, while the second 
question captures a shared responsibility and attitudes toward a policy that imply individual costs 
with potential free-riding possibilities. Hence, as our outcome variables are ordered – the distance 
between the categories is not consistent – it is most suitable to use a ordered logit model. 
Studying the intraclass correlation coefficient investigating the relationship between within and 
between variance, there is clustering within countries. For the question regarding attitudes toward 
governmental intervention 12% can be explained at a contextual level (i.e. cross-country variation), 
while for the question on willingness to pay higher taxes it is about 9 %. 
In order to measure interpersonal trust, we use the question “Do you think most people would try 
to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?”. People are asked to 
place themselves on a scale form 1-10 where 1= would take advantage and 10 = try to be fair. Even 
though this operational definition of interpersonal trust has been criticized (Lundmark, Gilljam & 
Dahlberg, 2015; Thöni, Tyran, Wengström, 2012) it is an established way to measure interpersonal 
trust. Institutional trust on the other hand is to some extent a more troublesome concept in the 
sense that it can imply a lot of things, such as for example national pride or support for the incum-
bent party (Levi and Stoker 2000). In order to measure institutional trust an index based on peo-
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ple’s stated confidence in “the police”, “the justice system” and “the civil service” (Cronbach’s α: 
.77) is used, capturing what can be defined as trust in implementing political institutions. Trust in 
implementing political institutions is argued to be substantially different from trust in representative 
institutions, such as “the government” or “the parliament”. It is claimed that trust in implementing 
institutions is less dependent on partisanship and so forth and rather capture the perceived quality 
of public institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2008), which is the primary interest of this text.   
Education has also been recoded into three categories (provided by the WVS): lower, middle and 
upper. In a similar way household income is recoded as low, medium and high. In order to capture 
political position, people are asked to place themselves on a scale from 1-10 “In political matters, 
people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally 
speaking?” (1=left, 10=right). Three categories are generated: left (1-4), center (5-6) and right (7-
10). We also include a control for gender (female=1, male=0). 
Previous research on pro-environmental policy preferences has argued that the cross-country varia-
tion can be explained by the quality of government (QoG) (Harring 2014; 2015). Therefore we also 
include these variables as controls on country-level. In order to capture QoG we use Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2005, which is highly correlated with other 
cross-national measures of QoG or good governance (Svensson 2005). CPI is obtained through the 
Quality of Government data set (Teorell et al. 2011).  
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Results 
TABLE 1, THE IMPACT OF INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST ON ATTITUDES TOWARD 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND TAXATION. MULTILEVEL ORDERED LOGISTIC MODEL.  
 
1 2 
 
Regulation Taxation 
Fixed                                                     
Interpersonal trust 0.98*   1.02**  
 
[0.96,0.99]    [1.01,1.04]    
   
Institutional trust 0.84*** 1.46*** 
 
[0.76,0.92]    [1.35,1.58]    
   
Gender(female) 1.03    1.00    
 
[0.99,1.07]    [0.96,1.04]    
Age
a 
  
Young 1.04    0.97    
 
[0.98,1.10]    [0.92,1.03]    
   
Middle-aged 1.04   1.00    
 
[0.99,1.09]    [0.96,1.05]    
   
In a relationship 0.98    1.00    
 
[0.94,1.03]    [0.96,1.05]    
Education
b 
  
Low 1.15*** 0.90*** 
 
[1.10,1.21]    [0.85,0.94]    
   
High 0.75*** 1.27*** 
 
[0.71,0.79]    [1.20,1.33]    
Ideological position
c 
  
Left 0.87*** 1.33*** 
 
[0.83,0.92]    [1.26,1.40]    
   
Right 0.97    1.01    
 
[0.93,1.02]    [0.96,1.05]    
   
Income 0.95*** 1.05*** 
 
[0.94,0.96]    [1.04,1.06]    
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QoG 0.88**  0.92   
 
[0.81,0.96]    [0.85,1.00]    
   
Random                                                     
Constant 1.45*** 1.47*** 
 
[1.23,1.72]    [1.23,1.74]    
   
 
                                                    
Interpersonal trust 1.00*** 1.00**  
 
[1.00,1.00]    [1.00,1.00]    
   
 
                                                    
Institutional trust 1.09*** 1.05*** 
 
[1.04,1.14]    [1.02,1.08]    
   
Log likelihood -43749.32    -42930.16    
Degrees of freedom 12.00    12.00    
AIC 87534.65    85896.32    
N level 2 37 37 
N level 1 36846 36717 
Comment: Data: World Values Survey 2005. Odds ratios. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. See methods for the exact wordings 
of the questions.   section * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001a Reference category: “Old”, bReference category: “Middle”, c Reference 
category: “Center” 
 
Table 1 reports odds ratios and significance levels from a multilevel ordered logit model. As an 
odds ratio below one indicate a decreased probability,  we see that both the more trust people have 
in unknown others (.98) and the more trust they have in the implementing public institutions (.84) 
the more negative they are toward government intervention in the form of regulation . Hence, 
those who have low  interpersonal and institutional trust are more positive toward government 
regulation. The effects of the two trust measures do not outdo each other and the effects are signif-
icant under control for several individual level and contextual level controls We also include ran-
dom variation for both interpersonal trust and institutional trust and we find that there are signifi-
cant and substantial effects for institutional trust. Hence the effects are to some extent different in 
different countries. However, the fixed effects for both interpersonal and institutional trust are still 
significant.  People who have low institutional trust are “punishers” who are more positive toward 
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government intervention. It is important to note that the effects of institutional trust are stronger 
than the effects of interpersonal trust. 
Studying the effects of interpersonal and institutional trust on the acceptability of taxes we find that 
are also a significant effect of trust. People who perceive implementing public institutions as trust-
worthy and those who find people in general as trustworthy are more willing to pay higher taxes for 
environmental protection. Yet again it is important to point out that we find that the effect of insti-
tutional trust is stronger than the effect of interpersonal trust. These effects are robust and signifi-
cant including both several controls on individual and country level, and random variation.  
Regarding the other variables in the model the effects are according to previous findings and as-
sumptions. People who place themselves on the left on the left-right-scale are more positive to 
both regulation and taxation. Leftist people are more positive to market intervention. People with 
high incomes are more prepared to pay taxes. Higher education is also associated with the willing-
ness to pay taxes. Regarding the cross-country effect of QoG we find that going from low QoG 
countries to high QoG countries people are more probable to demand government intervention in 
terms of regulation. The effect on willingness to pay taxes is not significant.  
 
Discussion 
As it is clear from the results section both our first hypothesis (the more individuals trust their fel-
low citizens and their public institutions the more positive their attitude toward government taxa-
tion), and second hypothesis (the less individuals trust their fellow citizens and their public institu-
tions, the more positive their attitude toward government regulation)  seem to be supported by the 
data. 
Additionally, another important finding is that the effect of institutional trust –both the negative 
effect on the demand for regulation and the positive effect on the acceptance of a tax increase – is 
stronger than the effects of generalized trust. Hence perceptions of public administration’s trust-
worthiness are more important for shaping individual attitudes towards government intervention 
than perceptions of fellow citizens’ trustworthiness… generalized trust which makes previous find-
ings arguing that the demand for regulation is driven by a lack of trust in market actors open to 
discussion.  
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Conclusions 
This paper has aimed to explore at micro-level the puzzling relationship at macro-level between the 
average levels of trust in a country and the degree of intervention of its government regarding regu-
lation and redistribution. Why do governments in high-trust countries tend to regulate relative little 
their economies while at the same time they impose high taxes and redistribution? And why do 
low-trust societies tend to have governments that intervene highly in relation to regulation, but 
poorly in redistribution? 
We believe this paper contributes to the literature in several ways. In the first place, by disentan-
gling the effects of trust over regulation and taxation the paper helps to reconcile two opposing 
views on the role of interpersonal trust within the social scientists: those who, like Alesina and An-
geletos (2005), Aghion et al. (2010) or Pinotti (2012), link low trust to higher government interven-
tion; and those who, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) or Rothstein (2011) who link low trust to low 
government intervention.  
Secondly, the paper helps to reconcile traditionally opposing views on regulation. From Pigou 
(1938), many scholars have noted that regulation is a second-best solution to market failures (Pinot-
ti 2012). Yet, on the contrary, many other scholars have largely criticized government regulation on 
the basis that it is a rent-seeking device (Tullock 1967, Stigler 1971). In partial support of the critical 
views on regulation, our findings indicate that regulation may be driven by a punishing spirit/norm: 
individuals who mistrust their government do nevertheless demand more regulation. It is a vicious 
circle in the sense that redistributive polices cannot be implemented unless there is a rule-based 
state in place. Cheating with taxes will generate a demand for even more regulation (and not higher 
taxes). An analogy to this can be found in the public administration literature where there is a longing 
for the Weberian well-functioning regulatory state rather than or market-based policies in countries 
with dysfunctional bureaucracies (cf. Pierre & Rothstein 2011).  
People who perceive that their fellow citizens trustworthy are more positive toward government 
intervention that involves individual costs and free-riding risks, indicating the necessity of a social 
structure with high trust between actors for the acceptance of state intervention that imply individ-
ual costs for the public good, while low institutional trust through a willingness to punish, can gen-
  17 
erate a demand for more government intervention. It is not easy to totally decipher these different 
effects of trust in different actors with survey data and we encourage scholars to challenge or test 
these hypotheses using other data and designs. 
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i
 The trust variable (vetical axis) is the response to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”, where the response “most people can be trust-
ed” has been coded as 1 and “can’t be too careful” has been coded as 0. The regulation variable (horizontal axis) is an 
Index of Regulation from Hopkin, Lapuente and Möller (2013), where higher values indicate a higher level of regulation. 
It is composed of nine regulation variables measuring different aspects of labor, product and financial market regulation 
from the World Bank, the OECD, and the Heritage Foundation,  which were included in a PCA analysis (Variance ex-
plained: 43.7%, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.733): Difficulty of Hiring Index, Rigidity of Hours 
Index, Difficulty of Redundancy Index,  Starting a Business Procedures, Starting a Business Cost, the OECD Indicator 
of Product Market Regulation, Trade Freedom, Investment Freedom, and Financial Freedom.   
ii
 Trust variable (vertical axis), idem as Figure 1. The redistribution variable (horizontal axis) is the reduction in inequality 
caused by taxes and transfers, in percent, data from the OCED Dataset Income distribution – Inequality. The data refers 
to the late 00’s. Available here: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=INEQUALITY  
